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Honorable Willie Brown, Jr. 
Speaker of the Assembly 
State Capitol, West Wing-Room 209 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
Darlene E. Fridley 
Enclosed herewith is the first in a series of reports by the 
staff of the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee on California 
Corrections. The purpose of this report is to provide members 
of the Assembly with a brief overview of the problems confronting 
the Department of Corrections in the coming years with particular 
emphasis on the fiscal needs of the prison system. 
This report is primarily the work of Lewis H. Fudge, a former chief 
institutional planner for the Department of Corrections with 
more than twenty-five years experience in corrections, and Jeffrey 
P. Ruch, a committee consultant. I also wish to thank the Director, 
Ruth Rushen, and the California Department of Corrections for their 
cooperation in the preparation of the report. 
In my judgment, the report findings highlight problems which are of 
great importance, not only for the Department of Corrections, but 
for all Californians who are concerned with the future of our 
criminal justice system. 
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I. FINDINGS 
The California Department of Corrections (CDC) is facing 
workload, funding, and operational problems of monumental proportions: 
1. CDC Is Experiencing A Population Explosion. 
Since the advent of the Determinate Sentencing Law in 1977, CDC 
population has increased by over 7,000 prisoners (20,629 to 
27,651). During 1981, the prison population has grown at a 
rate of 100 persons a week. CDC is now projecting that the 
prison population will accelerate to 39,787 by 1984-85 and may 
reach 46,564 during 1989-90. 
TABLE ONE 
CDC TENTATIVE REVISED POPULATION ESTIMATES 
July 23, 1981 
As of June 30 of Fiscal Year Total1 
1980-81 27,210 2 
1981-82 30,605 
1982-83 34,505 
1983-84 37,626 
1984-85 39,797 
1985-86 40,784 
1986-87 42,626 
1987-88 43,906 
1988-89 45,556 
1989-90 46,564 
1
while these are CDC totals (male, female, felon and 
non-felon) , only male felon figures were recalculated. 
2Actual. 
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2. CDC Is Facing A Housing Crunch 
Despite spending five years and millions of dollars in planning 
for additional prisons, none of these prooosed institutions is 
under construction. In fact, prison bed capacity has actually 
declined over the last 10 years. The CDC is several years 
behind in meeting housing needs that were forecast as early 
as 1976. 
The CDC will require between 11 and 13 new prisons in order to 
provide some 18,413 additional prison beds needed to house 
projected inmate populations throuqh 1990. Current cost 
estimates for new prison facility construction ranges from 
$40,000 a bed for minimum security (Level I) housing through 
$100,000 a bed for maximum security (Level IV) housing. Even 
if a low general figure of $50,000 a bed for the total range of 
needed housing is used as the multiplier, new construction costs 
will approach $1 billion by 1990. This figure does not include 
the very substantial capital outlay costs that would be required 
to renovate existing facilities. 
Institution studies carried out during 1980 show that the 
majority of existing correctional institutions do not meet 
contemporary standards, as developed by the American Correctional 
Association and other agencies. On this basis, the 1980 CDC 
Facilities Requirements Plan recommends the upgrading of existing 
institutions and the provision of a number of new institutions, 
at a total cost of $1.3 billion. However, these estimates were 
made on the basis of population projections which were much 
smaller than the CDC is now forecasting. 
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3. Annual CDC Support Costs Are Accelerating. 
In fiscal year 1966-67 with a total of 28,140 inmates, the 
CDC support budget was $96,580,903. In fiscal 1981-82 with 
a smaller prisoner workload (27,651), the CDC support budget 
is $429,783,872. Over the last five years, the CDC budget 
grew 110% while the state's inflation rate for the same 
period was 63.6%. 
If support cost trends are projected forward in relation to 
anticipated prison population growth, annual CDC support 
costs will total $1.33 billion by fiscal year 1989-90. 
Per capita inmate costs have more than doubled in the last 
five years (from $6,237 per annum in 1975-76 to $13,087 per 
annum in 1981-82). At the current rate of growth, the cost 
of maintaining a single prisoner for one year will reach 
$25,526 by fiscal year 1989-90. 
4. The CDC Workforce Has Grown At A Faster Rate Than Inmate 
Population. 
CDC staff has increased from 6,924 in 1966-67 to 9,373 in 
1981-82 despite a net decrease in inmate population over that 
period of time. Thus, for example, while inmate populations 
plunged in 1972, and again in 1975, CDC staff was increasing. 
During the last decade, CDC staff expanded by over 2,500 
positions while inmate totals remained relatively constant 
(27,055 inmates in 1970-71 versus 27,651 inmates in 1981-82) 
(See Table Two] . 
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If the CDC maintains present staffing ratios in response to 
growing prisoner populations over the next decade, the CDC 
workforce will reach 16,056 by 1989-90. 
These workforce expansions have not been confined to the 
institutional guardlines. CDC "Central Office" administrative 
staff has grown from 165 positions in 1971 to 356 positions 
in 1981. 
l 
Category Totals I 
I 
I 
Inmate 
Population 
Staff 
Support 
Ad01inistrative 
Administration 
Staff 
Inmate to Staff 
Ratios 
SO Staff/ 
Pop 
Folsom 
Staff/Pop 
CMF 
Staff/Pop 
Per Capita Costs 
TABLE TWO 
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
STAFFING AND COST COMPARISONS 
1960 - 1981 
I 
1 1975-76 1960-61 ! 1970-71 
i 
I 
20,610 27,055 I 24,233 3,816 6,852 8,327.8 
$35,490,596 $117,169,777 $203,566,256 
s 644,491 s 1,855,948 $ 5,714,592 
101.3 164.4 231.4 
4 to 1 CMF 
6.9 to 1 Fol 3.6 to 1 
562.4 508.7 
4832 -- '3';641 
390.3 398.1 
2700 1';'TDO 
487 575.9 
!940 IT70 
s 1,600 $ 6,237 
5. CDC Institutional Security Is Deteriorating. 
1981-82 + or - Differenc 
1960-81 
26,976 + 6,366 
9,373.4 + 5,557.4 
$429,783,872 +$394,293,276 
$ 32,292,671 +$ 31,638,180 
372 + 270.7 
3.5 to 1 + 2.25 to 1 
884.8 + 322.4 
m - I7'00 
522.6 + 132.3 
2,056 -~ 
729.2 + 242.2 
2,TI3 +4-n----
$ 13,087 $ 11,487 
Despite increased staffing, inmate violence and disruption has 
steadily grown. Fifteen CDC staff members have been murdered by 
inmates since 1970. During this same period, there have been 
218 fatal assaults by prisoners compared to 88 during the prior 
decade. Serious incidents have increased from 366 in 1970 to 
2,848 in 1980. Assaults on staff by inmates have skyrocketed 
from 59 during 1970 to 303 during 1980. Protracted and expensive 
lockdowns have become commonplace in CDC. 
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TP.BLE THREE 
NUMBER OF ASSAULTS BY IN~·~TES ON STAFF 
1970 - 1980 
Nu~ber of assaults . 
CaJendar -~ Total number 
year Co=itted by CocC'..iHed by of staff Total involved men .. -;J.-:len 
1970 ······••··••• 59 57 2 ]Be 1971 
···•······••• 67 64 3 84 
.1972 ......•...••• 55 51 4 74 
1973 ·········•••• 84 78 6 132 
.. 
1974 ·•·•···•··••• 93 83 10 131 
1975 ······•··•·•• 65 ~ . 7 104 1976 ·····•·····•• 94 18 1JJ 1977 ...•......••• 110 10B 2 149 
1978 ··········••• 182 170 12 231 
1979 ·······•···•• 323' 311 12 401 -
1980 ......•..•.•• 
.303 281 22 405 
. 
Note: These data are based upon incident reports sut~itted by the_institu:ions to Off~nder Inf?r~at:on 
Services. Due to reporting irregularities, to!al assaults ~ 1973 1ncluded a d1sproport1onately 
high mr..t-er of 1 ess serious incidents. 
6. Chronic Prisoner Idleness Has Not Been Remedied. 
Despite annual statements that expansion of prisoner work programs 
is a matter of high priority, there has been no substantial increase 
in such programs. Approximately 10% of the current inmate popu-
lation is employed in correctional industries. 
7. CDC Has Failed To Adjust Its Goals And Methods To Changed 
Circumstances. 
Although rehabilitation is no longer a primary purpose of 
imprisonment since the repeal of indeterminate sentencing, 
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CDC continues to retain rehabilitation-oriented staff 
classifications and inmate programs. 
At the same time, CDC has increasingly resorted to high cost, 
high security lockdown units in its attempts to control 
inmate violence and disruption. 
California Corrections has experienced a steady decline in 
cost and program effectiveness over the last decade. CDC 
shows no sign of reversing this trend over the corning decade. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
"Life can only be understood backwards; 
but it must be lived forwards." 
Kierkegaard 
While state prisons have existed in California since 1852, 
it was not until 1944 that the prisons were organized into a state-
wide correctional network. In that year the Legislature created the 
present Department of Corrections and the then Board of Prison Terms. 
Richard A. McGee, a career penologist of national reputation, was 
recruited to become the state's first Director of Corrections. 
McGee's appointment came at a time when the State of 
California was receptive to the reform and reorganization of its 
scattered prisons. Starting with the archaic, often corrupt, and 
usually brutal prisons of San Quentin and Folsom, McGee developed 
the new Department of Corrections into a highly regarded correctional 
organization. This network of prisons was based upon the indeter-
minate sentence, professional level classification, and extensive 
rehabilitation programs. These features, together with "state of 
the art" correctional management techniques, were intended to 
effectively rehabilitate a rapidly expanding inmate population. 
This was considered the "Golden Age" of California Corrections. 
Staff and inmates generally accepted the changed prison social order. 
The CDC was provided with modern institutions, professional staff, 
and inmates who, for the most part, accepted correctional leadership, 
the rehabilitative purpose, and the "medical model" techniques. 
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By the ear 1960's, CDC's "classic" era began to erode. 
A long chain of events transpired which led the Department to its 
present straits. 
1. Changing Prisoner Attitudes. 
Two simultaneous and related changes signaled the beginning of 
the end of what was considered a model prison system. First was 
the growing number of inmates who rejected correctional rehabili-
tation, as then practiced, together with its humanistic artifacts. 
The second change, a growing number of assertive black prisoners, 
drew far more notice by prison staff. This new phenomenon was 
most dramatically manifested by the emergence of the Black Muslim 
movement in California prisons. 
Prior to their appearance, the CDC, like most prison systems, 
effected prisoner control with divide and conquer techniques. 
This incorporated the extensive use of inmate informers -- "the 
snitch system" -- and an official policy of each prisoner being 
given individual attention and treatment "the do your own 
number system." Prisoners who joined the Nation of Islam 
confounded these control techniques. The Muslims organized 
themselves into disciplined groups which were capable of 
collective action. 
CDC staff were alarmed at these developments. Black Muslims 
were harassed and routinely placed in segregation lockup. The 
Muslims went to court seeking constitutional protection for the 
exercise of their religious practices in prison. The courts 
responded in In re Ferguson, 361 P.2d 417 (1961), and related 
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decisions which ic First religious safe-
guards to incarcerated Black Muslims. 
Grudgingly, the CDC prison staff sanctioned the legitimacy of 
the Black Muslims. With the passage of time, the organization 
proved to be a generally positive influence upon its members and 
upon institution operations. However, line staff continued to 
resent and fear the organization. They were a symbol of unwanted 
change. It was not until the late 1970's that the Muslims were 
permitted to use institution chapel complexes for office space 
and religious services or were provided with regular visits by 
outside ministers from the Nation of Islam. 
2. Court Intervention and the End of Administrative Discretion. 
Up until the present generation, the courts were generally 
reluctant to intervene into the affairs of prisons or their 
inmates. This traditional "Hands Off" doctrine was best expressed 
in Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 VA (21 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871): 
"A convicted felon as a consequence of his 
crime not only forfeited his liberty, but 
all his personal rights except those which 
the law in its humanity accords to him. He 
is for the time being the slave of the state." 
Beginning in the 1960's and extending up to the present a series 
of court decisions gave prisoners legal rights which were 
previously unrecognized. The courts applied due process pro-
tections to the imposition of prison discipline (see Wolff v. 
Me Donnell, 488 U.S. 539 [1974]), freedom of expression rights 
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to inmate correspondence (See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 
396 [1974]), and Sixth Amendment access rights to legal services 
and law libraries (See Fostre v. McGuinis, 442 F.2d 178 [1971], 
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 [1972]). 
Perhaps the most dramatic and direct judicial interventions 
revolved around prison conditions themselves. In the landmark 
case of Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (1966), unsanitary 
conditions and operational practices in Soledad Prison's Isolation 
Cells were held to be unnecessarily punitive and violative of the 
Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment. 
Since Jordan, entire state prison systems have been found uncon-
stitutional under Eighth Amendment standards. 
The cumulative effect of these decisions has been to restrict the 
administrative discretion vested in prison officials. From the 
warden to the guard, all penal staff were affected. Although not 
in an enviable position, the prisoner was no longer "the slave of 
the state." As with another emancipation proclamation, the 
subsequent reconstruction period has been slow and painful. 
The CDC attempted to change its practices to mesh with the 
continuing series of court actions, but without uniform success. 
The resistance of prison staff, naturally enough, was fiercest 
where court decisions limited or eliminated management tools for 
the control of inmates. With the advent of determinate sentencing 
and automatic "good time," prison officials lost even the ability 
to meaningfully affect the release date of most inmates. 
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New management s have s to fill the void left 
after the demise of the Hands Off Doctrine. 
3. Population and Policy Changes. 
In 1967, following the election of Ronald Reagan as California's 
Governor, Richard A. McGee was removed as Secretary of the Youth 
and Correctional Agency and Walter Dunbar, who had succeeded 
McGee as Director, was also replaced. Governor Reagan later 
abolished the Youth and Correctional Agency and placed both the 
CDC and Youth Authority under the general guidance of the sprawling 
Health and Welfare Agency. Raymond Procunier, a career prison 
administrator, was appointed CDC Director. These changes were to 
profoundly alter the effectiveness of the CDC during the years 
ahead. 
Two concurrent policy decisions by the Reagan Administration were 
to prove equally significant. First, probation subsidy legis-
lation of 1965 was given maximum support. This legislation 
encouraged individual counties, through money grants, to 
substantially reduce the number of convicted felons sent to the 
state prison system. Because of probation subsidy, the percentage 
of felons sent to the CDC from the counties declined from about 
21% up to 1966 to 10% or less during 1969, 1970 and 1971. 
Second, and directly related to probation subsidy, a proqram of 
early prisoner releases was undertaken by the Adult Authority. 
The result was a precipitous drop in the CDC population. Dating 
from 1969 the inmate population declined from an all time high 
of 28,795 to only 19,088 three years later. 
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Initially the workload would 
ease the CDC's growing management difficulties. This was not to 
be the case. Instead, the prison system, so carefully structured 
during the era of Richard McGee, was thrown badly out of balance. 
The sudden exodus of conforming inmates shattered traditionally 
stabilizing prison sub-culture, which sought peaceful accommodation 
with the formal management system. The CDC was forced to close or 
reduce a number of correctional facilities, and the standard 
practice of double celling was ended. This led to the present 
severe bed shortage with which the CDC is now struggling. 
Already sorely afflicted by changing social attitudes, by frequent 
court interventions, by an abrupt change of administrative leader-
ship, and by a suddenly reduced inmate population of radically 
changed composition, CDC Director Ray Procunier attempted to chart 
a new course for the system. Procunier discarded much of the 
planning and structure of the department under McGee. Rules and 
regulations were substantially liberalized. Administrative and 
training manuals became outdated. Inmate organizations were 
encouraged. San Quentin inmates coalesced to hold "Unity Day" 
strikes. 
The changes proved to be too much and too fast for CDC. Former 
close knit staff relationships unraveled. An exodus of career 
executives from CDC began and continued through the regime of 
Procunier's successor, Jeri Enomoto. Even more damaging to the 
system, a large number of capable middle managers and senior 
guardline supervisors retired from or quit the CDC. (Several of 
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these departing California prison officials have gone on to head 
prisons and correctional systems in other states.) Alienation 
of line staff from the CDC "central office" set in and the 
resulting staff morale problems are still with us. 
4. The Rise of Inmate Gangs and the Resurgence of Security Controls. 
As an underground complement to the authorized self-help organi-
zations, a growing variety of inmate tips, cliques and gangs 
began to proliferate. The Mexican Mafia was the first of these 
convict gangs to gain department-wide notoriety. Somewhat later, 
the Black Guerrilla Family, the Nuestra Familia and the Aryan 
Brothers began to vie for prison dominance. With the formation 
of these violence prone and predatory gangs -- brown, black 
and white -- a formal structure of racial separation began in 
prison operations. 
Although each of these prison gangs contributed to the further 
disruption of CDC institutions, it was the Black Guerrilla 
Family (BGF) which proved to be the most threatening and 
dangerous to line staff. At Soledad prison on January 13, 1970, 
there occurred a tragic and consequence-laden incident. "A gun 
tower guard rapidly fired several shots into a group of 
Adjustment Center prisoners, who were fighting during their 
brief exercise period, and he killed three black prisoners. A 
two year period of extreme violence between prisoners (mostly 
black) and guards followed" (Irwin, 1980:89-90). 
During the prior decade a total of two CDC officers had been 
murdered by inmates. In the decade of the 1970's, however, 
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13 staff were lled by inmates, primarily by black gangs. This 
epidemic of line staff murders reached its height in August 1971 
when the black revolutionary convict George Jackson smuggled a 
gun into the San Quentin Adjustment Center and gained control of 
this high security, lockdown unit. In the blood bath that 
followed, three prison quards were murdered and several others 
were left for dead. Two white inmate unit workers were also 
murdered. George Jackson was killed as he fled from the unit. 
Upon taking over the Adjustment Center, George Jackson stated, 
"The black dragon has come to San Quentin." In fact, Jackson's 
black dragon spread far beyond the walls of San Quentin and 
permeated the entire Department of Corrections. Badly shaken 
by what had occurred, and at guardline insistence, the CDC began 
to embroider its rehabilitative programs with increased custodial 
controls. Post assignment schedules were lengthened to accom-
modate more and more uniformed officers. 
But staffing increases and more stringent security controls did 
not restore control or order. Instead, they appeared to aggra-
vate the problem as inmate violence against staff and other 
inmates accelerated during the next ten years. Despite this 
graphic evidence of failure, the CDC continued to employ more 
and more staff to incapacitate a growing percentage of inmates 
in high cost, high security, lockdown units. 
At the same time, CDC left in place the program artifacts of 
medical model rehabilitation and continued to liberalize the 
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rules and regulations governing inmate discipline, correspondence, 
visiting, personal property, and program accountability. To the 
growing frustration of line staff, the CDC administration appeared 
to be pursuing policies which were in direct conflict with each 
other. 
TABLE FOUR 
NUMBER AND TYPE OF INCIDENTS 
Summary By Year 
1970 - 1980 
I n c i,d c n t a 
. 
Plu::-.ber T1pc of ir.cideni 
Calendar 
year 
, 
. 
Ra i.e 
:rotal per 100 Assau1 t Poss. NAr-
inc irlenh average with Fights· of cot ics Sex Suicide OU.cr . 
inst. "'c~pon• "'tap on 
pop • 
. 
1970 ................. 366 1.36 ]9 '66 89. ao 15 11 26 
. 
1971 ................ us 2.00 124 ~.9 . 103 lOS 14 H 36 
1972 ................. 592 3.0, 18.9 69 132 lU 9 9 .(0 
1973 ~·············· 717 3.57 197 92 200 230 4 18 36 
197( •............•• 1,022 4.30 220 121 262 347 8 H 50 
. 
1975 
············-·· 
1,089 lt.73 212 110 2'19 1;30 13 9 66 
1976 ••·•••··••••••• 1,385 6.Bif 201f 131 193 776 6 7 68 
. 
1977 •••.••..•••••••• 1 ,81.5 8.]3 241 177 302 951 16 12 116 
1978 •••••• ; •••••••• 2,050 10.07 270 247 371, 1,0~ 18 .. 113 
. 
1979 ..........•..•• 2,427 10.90 309 389- 420 1,099 ''5) 8 17? 
. 
'~980 •••......•••••• 2,648 12.17 339 436 498 1,367 ~2 11 17.5 . 
•Includes fc~l in=idents. 
••Includes (1; less st:rious attacks on staff by men (throo..ing cold liq;.:ic!, food or cards). Due to reporting 
irrf'~u1arities, io~al fights this year included a disproportionately high nu:c;ber of less ~rious inddents 
r:ote: These c!ate. E>.re b2.!>ed upon in=i dent reports subr.;i Hed by the insti t.A ions to Offender lnfor::-.ati on Ser.n ces. 
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TABLE FIVE 
NUMBER OF PERSONS FATALLY INJURED DUE TO ASSAULTIVE INCIDENTS 
By Year 
1960 - 1980 
I nrnates Staff 
Cahn~r Total 
yf!ar Total Stabbed Beaten j Strangled Shot Po honed Stabbed 
19&0 ••••••••••• .4 4 4 - - I - - -19&"1 •····•··••• 8 8 1 1 - - - -1 96:? ••••••••••• 8 8 6 
-
2 
- - -
1963 ••••••••••• 8 1 6 - - 1 - 1 19&4 
·•·····•··• 
5 5 5 
- - - - -
"1965 ••••••••••• "10 9 1 1 
-
1 
-
1 
19&6 
·········•• 
4 4 3 
- -
1 
- -
1967 ••••••••••• 10 10 1 1 - 2' - -
1966 ............ "16 16 14 - - 1 1 -
1969 ............ 15 15 12 2 1 - - -
1970 ••••••••••• 13 11 1 - 1 3 - 2 
19n ........... 24 17 13 2 - 2' - 1 
1972 36 35 32 1 2 - - 1 •···••···•• 19 15 1 2 1 1 1973 ••.••••.••• 20 -
1974 23 23 20 2 1 - - -............ 
1975 ••••••••••• 17 17 15 - 1 1 - -
1976 ••••••••••• 20 19 17 1 1 - - 1 
19n 18 18 16 1 - 1 - I -··········• 13 1 2 1976 16 16 - - -
·····•··••• 16 16 1 I -1979 ···········• 15 - - -1380 ............ 14 13 13 - - - - 1 i I I 
l<ote: In 1972, one officer fatally shot outside institution during the esczpe of in-~te enroute to court and one officer 
blu::':;eoned fatally in 1976. lnr..ates fatally shot while aHer..pting to escape: 1 each in 1965, 1966, 19671 1971 
and 1973. 
5. Determinate Sentencing. 
In mid-1977 the sixty-year-old Indeterminate Sentencing Law (IDL) 
was replaced by Determinate Sentencing (DSL) . The DSL was 
initially hailed as a sweeping reform measure. Arbitrary and 
capricious policies of the Adult Authority under IDL would be 
eliminated. The majority of inmates from the onset of sentencing 
would know exactly how long they were to spend in prison. 
Sentencing parity would be achieved. 
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But there proved to be a reverse side to this reform measure. 
Each year since its passage there have been enhancements to the 
original DSL penalties. As the 1980 CDC Determinate Sentencing 
report commented: 
"The sheer existence of a system of fixed 
penalties subject to legislative amendment 
may make the system perpetually vulnerable 
to pressures for increasing penalties or 
extending their range." 
The DSL might better have been termed a mandatory sentencing law. 
Since its inception, the percentage of convicted felons sent to 
state prisons has sharply increased. Spurred forward by a rapidly 
increasing crime rate, the DSL has resulted in an incarceration 
rate in California of 91.5 per 100,000 of the state's population 
in the age group 18 to 49 with CDC projecting that the rate will 
rise to 116.12 per 100,000 by 1983 and continue during subsequent 
years. The current rate is already higher than any other 
industrial nation with the exception of South Africa and the 
Soviet Union. 
The consequence for CDC of rising incarceration rates with ever 
longer terms of commitment is severe overcrowding without the 
IDL relief valve of mass parole. 
The CDC had begun forecasting future population workloads since 
1976 but it was not until 1980 that CDC fully realized the 
magnitude of the problem. The 1977 CDC Analysis of Programs 
and New Facilities Proposal was the first concerted effort to 
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deal with the realities of the situation, but was rejected by 
the prison administration" ... as not being anything close to 
a statement of CDC policy, philosophy or direction" (Walters, 
1977:1) and suppressed. Nevertheless, over the past five years 
the CDC has piecemeal and grudgingly accepted the majority of 
findings and proposals contained in the 1977 proposal. 
The CDC is now pushing hard for the full implementation of its 
1980 Facilities Requirements Master Plan. Architectural drawings 
are being finalized for a new and controversial 1000 bed maximum 
security complex at Tehachapi. Actual construction is expected 
to begin by mid-1982. 
Conservation camps and community release facilities are now 
being expanded and increased in number as a result of recom-
mendations of the State Legislature's 1980 Citizens Advisory 
Committee on Alternatives to Incarceration. Double celling has 
been resumed on a department-wide basis. Temporary satelite 
units adjacent to five existing institutions are scheduled for 
construction and occupancy during 1982-83. 
Despite these measures, it is doubtful whether CDC's belated 
expansion plans can match expected increases in prison 
populations. 
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CHART ONE 
Department of Corrections Population 
1950 - 1983 
Prison 
Population 
(thousands) 
latest Projection 
33,500 by 
October 31. 1982 
Highest 
Population 
28,795 
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Current 
Population 
26,014 
III. CONCLUSION 
"Lost in our simplicity of times 
the world abounds with laws, 
and teems with crimes." 
The Philadelphia Gazette (1775) 
Corrections is the component of the criminal justice system 
for which the Legislature has the most direct responsibility. It 
is, therefore, particularly important for legislators to understand 
what is going on in our prison system. This report is intended to 
give a brief overview of California Corrections with S?ecial 
emphasis on the fiscal aspects of the system. 
The major challenge facing California Corrections over the 
next decade will be to successfully cope with rising prison popula-
tions, growing inmate violence, a deteriorating physical plant, 
newly-formed employee unions, and chronic prisoner idleness during 
a time of severe fiscal constraints. The present ability of 
Corrections to meet this challenge is in serious doubt. This 
report is an attempt to explain why. 
This report is the first in a series of five staff reports 
from the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice. Later reports 
will focus on inmate work programs, prison staffing, facility 
requirements, and correctional organization together with accompanying 
recommendations. 
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After an examination of cost and population trends it 
becomes apparent that Corrections will demand an even greater 
portion of our public dollar in the years ahead. Given that there 
will be no shortage of competing social priorities for state 
funding, it is incumbent upon policymakers to insure that California's 
correctional system is as efficient and efficacious as possible. 
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